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Avoiding "Elective Dictatorship" in the
United Kingdom: Debate on
Constitutional and Electoral Reform
Through Proportional Representation
By JoHN A. ZECCA*
We are moving more and more in the direction of an elective dicta-
torship... because the opposed parties, becoming more and more po-
larized in their attitudes ... in the presence of narrow majorities ...
believe that the prerogatives and rights conferred by electoral victory...
compel [them] to impose on the hapless but unorganized majority irre-
versible changes for which it [the majority] never consciously voted.
-Lord Hailsham,
former Lord Chancellor of the
Judicial House of Lords, Britain's
highest court1
A rarity among nations, the United Kingdom (UK) has no formal
written constitution to provide an ultimate guide to questions of govern-
ment. Rather than a formal document, the British have developed an
"unwritten constitution" that is little more than an amorphous concept
referring collectively to the laws, understandings, and traditions that
have helped create and expand the government over centuries.2 Instead
of the government relying on a constitution, the UK possesses a constitu-
tion that relies on the government since there is no document either
describing the structure of the state or enumerating its powers.3 As a
* B.S., Cornell University, 1988. The author wishes to thank the research staff of the
University of London's Institute for Advanced Legal Studies for access to their invaluable
resources.
1. LORD HAILSHAM, THE DILEMMA OF DEM,-ocRAcY 21 (1978).
2. Webster's Dictionary defines "constitution" as "the system of fundamental principles
according to which a nation... is governed." WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1983).
Technically, since a constitution need not be a single document, the UK's Constitution quali-
fies as such by definition, although there has never been an attempt to codify this "unwritten
constitution." R.M. PUNNm-r, BRITISH GOVERNMENT & POLITICS 176 (5th ed. 1987). See
also James Cornford, On Writing a Constitution, 44 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 558, 558-59
(1991). The UK's Constitution will be further examined infra part l.A.
3. PUNNETF, supra note 2, at 178.
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result of this power vacuum, Parliament, the national legislature, has be-
come the supreme constitutional body and is technically able to alter or
even abolish the very foundations of government.4
The unwritten constitution also fails to enumerate the rights of Brit-
ish citizens, including the form of political representation to which they
are entitled.' In the absence of a document specifying which rights are
inalienable, such questions are left to the politicians.6 The absence of a
written constitution creates an extreme case of conflict of interest by
granting the beneficiaries of the electoral system sole power over the sys-
tem's creation.7 The 651 members of the UK's "lower" house, the
House of Commons, have ultimate control over the electoral system
which reelected them.'
Parliament is divided into two houses: the House of Lords, whose
nonelected members are called peers;9 and the House of Commons,
whose members, referred to as Members of Parliament or MPs, are indi-
vidually elected by voters in constituencies throughout Great Britain and
Northern Ireland.10 Today, most political power rests with the House of
Commons."'
The unwritten constitution is understood to require regular national
elections, currently conducted using the "first past the post" electoral
system. 12 This system awards the seat in Parliament to whomever re-
ceives the most votes (the first past the post) in each constituency, even
though the winning candidate often garners less than fifty percent of the
4. HAILSHAM, supra note 1, at 125-26.
5. PUNNETT, supra note 2, at 178.
6. Some critics, like Punnett, argue that this precludes controversial political debates on
what rights are "inalienable" and promotes legal flexibility. Id.
7. See H. W. R. WADE, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNDAMENTALS 1-8 (1980), for a discussion
of the general lack of interest in equality of representation in the UK and the absence of a
constitutional court like the U.S. Supreme Court, able to maintain the value of the vote.
8. Michael Curtis, United Kingdom, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 1, 63 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1982). For a description of the
composition of Parliament, see PUNNETr, supra note 2, at 209-314.
9. Curtis, supra note 8, at 97. Members of the House of Lords have the right to a seat
based on heredity or life appointment by the government. The duties of the Lords are limited,
and they cannot defeat legislation already passed by the House of Commons, PUNNETr, supra
note 2, at 296-305.
10. Curtis, supra note 8, at 43. The country is divided into single member constituencies
so that each MP represents an individual constituency. Id. This system is much like that used
in the United States for members of the House of Representatives.
11. Because the House of Commons holds the majority of power in Parliament, hereinaf-
ter "Parliament" refers to the House of Commons.
12. Dawn Oliver, Reform of the Electoral System, PUBLIC LAW 108, 108 (Spring 1983).
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total vote.1 3 When the vote tallies are aggregated it is likely that the
party holding a majority of seats did not win a majority of the votes cast
nationally.14 Such was the case in the election of April 9, 1992, when the
ruling Conservative party returned for a fourth consecutive term with
42.8% of the vote.15 Indeed, since World War II no government in the
UK has received the support of a majority of the electorate 16
Great Britain is the only country in the European Community using
a pure "first past the post" system for all elections." Attempts to unify
the voting procedure for the European Parliament are forcing Britons to
reevaluate both the fairness and the future of their present system. 8
Spearheading the drive for constitutional reform are third parties like the
Liberal Democrats who are disfavored under the current voting system.19
The two main parties, the Conservatives and Labor, have traditionally
opposed electoral change for fear it would lead to coalitions and end sin-
gle-party governing.20 Since any changes to the British constitution de-
pend on the political will of Parliament, the larger parties have protected
13. 0. HOOD PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 198 (7th ed.
1987).
14. PHILIP WILLIAMS & IAIN MCLEAN, WHY ELECTORAL REFOM7 3 (1981).
15. Election Results; How Labor Lost, ECONOMIST, Apr. 18, 1992, at 62.
16. RODNEY BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 46 (1991).
17. For a chart listing national electoral systems in western Europe, see EcONOMIST, Nov.
23, 1991, at 60 (Schools Brief).
18. See Oliver, supra note 12, at 114 (Treaty of Rome requires uniform system of election
to the European Parliament). See also TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (MAASTRICHT
TREATY), Feb. 7, 1992, art. 138(3), 31 I.L.M. 247 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1993) [hereinafter
MAASTRICHT TREATY]. France uses a modified "first past the post" system on the national
level but elects members of the European Parliament (MEPs) by proportional representation.
For a summary of EEC member European Parliament electoral systems, see Enid Lakeman,
Elections to the European Parliament, 43 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 77, 80-86 (1990).
19. See John Curtice & Michael Steed, Proportionality & Exaggeration in the British Elec-
toral System, 5 ELECTORAL STUDIES 209, 221 (1986). For example, in the 1983 elections,
when this phenomenon was most pronounced, the Liberal/SDP Alliance received only 2%
fewer votes nationwide than Labor but received 29% fewer seats: 209 for Labor, twenty-three
for Liberal/SDP Alliance. In 1992, the Liberal Democrats, no longer in alliance with the
SDP, received twenty seats. A pure proportional representation system [hereinafter PR]
would have netted the Liberal Democrats nearly one hundred seats. Business International
Country Monitor-United Kingdom, 1992 Bus. INT'L COUNTRY REP., Aug. 10, 1992.
20. See, eg., CONSERVATIVE RESEARCH DEP'T, PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 206,
214, 221 (1991) [hereinafter PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION]; JUDY JONES AND STEPHEN
GOODWIN, The Labor Party in Blackpoo" Hattersley Warns of Threat Posed by PR, Independ-
ent, Oct. 5, 1990, at 8 (Labor Deputy Leader arguing proportional representation meant that
Labor would never again govern on its own). This has been echoed by several Labor leaders
since the recent elections. 'Back PR' Call to Blair, Brown, GUARDIAN, Jan. 8, 1993, at 3. See
also BRAZIER, supra note 16, at 59; Bethan Hutton, The Labor Party at Blackpool: Divisions
Resurface on Electoral Reform, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1992, at 17.
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the status quo and allowed only limited electoral reform in this century.21
The alternative to the "first past the post" system is a system based
on proportional representation (PR), as used by other European coun-
tries.22 Systems that are genuinely proportional on a national level can
be loosely grouped into two categories. 23 The first category, the List Sys-
tem, allows the political parties to draw up lists of candidates. Voters in
the general election then choose between the different parties by choosing
the list of candidates they prefer.24 Under the second category, known as
preferential voting, the voter prioritizes the candidates, not only from
different parties but intra-party as well.25 The most common form of
preferential voting is the Single Transferable Vote (STV) which achieves
proportionality by electing as many as five people from a single, but
much larger, constituency than presently used in the UK. Since more
than one candidate is elected from the constituency, seats can be allo-
cated in proportion to votes received.26 In addition, the two categories
employ divergent standards of fairness.27
The Liberal Democrats and most other electoral reformers favor
some form of PR to ensure that parliamentary numbers more accurately
reflect voting percentages.28 In the wake of its 1992 defeat, the Labor
Party is currently split on whether to endorse PR as a way to dislodge
the Conservatives or to continue advocating the current system in hopes
of a future victory.2 9 The Conservative Party continues to oppose PR,
21. The Speaker's Conference, an ad hoc committee of MPs that deals with constitutional
reform, has met only five times in this century. WADE, supra note 7, at 2, 4. Some reform is
possible without a conference. See infra text accompanying notes 90-100.
22. Oliver, supra note 12, at 112-13.
23. For a brief summary of the two systems, see H. F. RAWLING;, LAW AND THE ELEC-
TORAL PROCESS 233-35 (1988); for a more thorough examination, ,;ee ANDREW REEVE &
ALAN WARE, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 1-14, 114-161 (1992).
24. Oliver, supra note 12, at 113.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 119-20.
27. See Raymond Plant, Criteria for Electoral Systems: The Labor Party and Electoral
Reform, 44 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 549, 554 (1991) (the List System represents fairness to
political parties, while the Single Transferable Vote-a form of preferential voting-looks to
the fairness of representing the plurality). Both systems can be fair depending on whether
Parliament should be a microcosm of society (STV) or whether there should be competition
between the parties as agents of the electorate (List). Id. at 552. Lord Plant serves as chairman
of a Labor Party commission currently studying the electoral system. This commission will
release its recommendations on which system the party should support sometime in 1993.
Seumas Milne, TGWU Leader Throws Weight Behind Party 'Modernisers,' GUARDIAN, Jan.
9, 1993, at 7.
28. Robin Oakley, Delegates Endorse Leaders' Poll Reform Gamble, THE TIMES
(London), Sept. 12, 1991 (Home News).
29. The Labor Party at Blackpool: Divisions Resurface on Electoral Reform, supra note
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arguing that PR requires complex mathematical formulas and that it
would alter the Anglo tradition of single members beholden to a specific
geographical area.
This Note examines how the British system fails to adequately rep-
resent the voters and has led to the regionalization of the two major par-
ties.3 ' Part I explores Britain's unwritten constitution and the legal
ramifications of electoral reform as part of a larger attempt at political
change, including the institution of a written constitution. Part II of the
Note discusses the current electoral system in the UK. Part III looks at
the various justifications used in favor of the current system and weighs
these justifications in light of recent elections. Part IV examines the vari-
ous systems of proportional representation, citing other European coun-
tries as examples. Finally, in Part V, this Note addresses the question of
which system is most likely to be adopted given the current political real-
ity in Great Britain.
I. THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION AND ITS
THEORIES
A. In Search of the Constitution
The origins of the British Constitution date from the Norman con-
quest of England in the eleventh century."2 In the many centuries since,
there has never been an attempt to codify its principles.3 3 Instead, ele-
ments of the Constitution are found in three sources:3 4 acts of Parliament
through the ages; the common law; and the so-called "conventions of
20, at 17. See also Ivo Dawnay, Moment of Truth for Kinnock, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1991, at
6 (electoral reform proponents are now Labor's largest pressure group); PROPORTIONAL REP-
RESENTATION, supra note 20, at 214-16 (detailing the split growing within Labor to begin
supporting PR).
30. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, supra note 20, at 210,213,220 (arguing that MPs
would have less incentive to pursue local matters in the larger multi-member constituencies
that PR would create). See also THE ELECTORAL REFORM SociET OF GREAT BRITAN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND, THE BEST SYSTEM 27 (1984) (arguing that an educated electorate can
understand the methodology of the various PR systems) [hereinafter THE BEST SYSFEM].
31. The ruling Conservative Party has few MPs from Scotland and the North of England,
while in the last Parliament Labor had none from agricultural constituencies. See Richard
Holme, Parties, Parliament and PR, in 1688-1988: TIME FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION 129, 134
(Richard Holme & Michael Elliot eds., 1990).
32. The strong local organization that predated the conquest aided King William in
preventing the breakup of his new kingdom since much of this was adopted, not replaced, by
the invaders. W. ANSON, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE CONSTrrTUTION 25-26 (1911).
33. PUNNETT, supra note 2, at 176.
34. These sources are not complete, and the many questions left open prompted Alexis de
Tocqueville to declare that the English Constitution does not exist. ANSON, supra note 32, at 7.
19931
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the constitution," or rules of political behavior that, although not law,
are strictly followed.35
Portions of the Constitution, including the Magna Carta,36 acts of
Parliament such as the Bill of Rights of 1688-1689, 31 and the Representa-
tion of the Peoples Act of 183238 are written. These acts of Parliament
are, however, merely legislation and can presumably be altered or re-
pealed by another piece of legislation obtaining a simple majority vote.39
Parliament is the sovereign constitutional body and is not bound by the
acts of preceding parliaments or by court decisions. ° As a result, any
aspect of the Constitution, from abolition of the nonelected House of
Lords to changing the size and length of Parliament, is within the pur-
view of the House of Commons.41 This power includes altering the elec-
toral system for political gain.42
The British system does not provide checks and balances on the ex-
ecutive. Instead, it centralizes power in the Parliament, making constitu-
tional study in Britain essentially an examination of politics.4" The
implied limits of the "conventions of the constitution" are the only ac-
knowledged limits on Parliament's powers.' The conventions are the
norms, practices, and constitutional standards of the day, addressing is-
sues such as the impartiality of the Speaker of the House of Commons
and the individual responsibility of ministers.4 5 Since these conventions
35. Curtis, supra note 8, at 63.
36. The Magna Carta is still listed in some constitutional texts as a statute, and among its
provisions is the first formal provision for summoning an assembly that included bishops,
earls, greater barons, and the tenants-in-chief (commons) to approve taxes. ANSON, supra note
32, at 47-48.
37. The Bill of Rights places limits on the royal prerogative and is considered the begin-
ning of the modem Constitution. It was mainly designed to strengthen the state at the expense
of the crown and is not a statement of personal rights as found in the U.S. Constitution, Id. at
37-38.
38. This Act extended suffrage to the middle class and ended the archaic system of "rot-
ten boroughs," which were constituencies that, although having lost their populations over
time, still sent MPs to Parliament. See CHARLES SEYMOUR, ELECTORAL REFORM IN ENG-
LAND AND WALES 8 (1915).
39. PUNNETT, supra note 2, at 178.
40. Curtis, supra note 8, at 64.
41. PUNNETT, supra note 2, at 178.
42. In 1930 a minority Labor government formed a coalition with the Liberals to promote
voting reform. THE BEST SYSTEM, supra note 30, at 17. However, the coalition collapsed
before the reform legislation passed. Id. Many commentators expected a similar deal had the
1992 election resulted in a hung parliament. See, e.g., Alison Smith, Liberal Democrats at
Bournemouth, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1991, at 4.
43. PUNNETT, supra note 2, at 179.
44. These conventions form the bulk of constitutional practice, Id. at 177.
45. Id.
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are not based on statutes, they can change with each era.45 There is no
specific source for these conventions and no guide for their future
development.47
Defenders of the British constitutional system point to its flexibility
in dealing with social changes.4 8 Alteration is not constrained by ques-
tions of tradition or the intent of the deceased framers.4 9 Critics counter
that the government's powers are effectively limitless.5' Some commen-
tators would prefer codification of individual rights.51 Others contend
that the lack of an impartial constitutional court as a final arbiter allows
only a political, and not a legal, interpretation of the Constitution.52
Others feel a supreme court would drag the judiciary into political
debates.
53
Another criticism of the unwritten Constitution is that its vagueness
will force Britons to rely on the European law created by the European
Economic Community (EEC), rather than on domestic law.' Member-
ship in the EEC requires the UK to comply with the Treaty of Rome,
which established the EEC. Unlike domestic statutes in Great Britain,
the provisions of this Treaty are subject to judicial review and interpreta-
tion.55 In fact, when the UK joined the EEC, the British Parliament
surrendered part of its sovereignty for the first time.56 By statute, British
courts are required to adhere to EEC law and are now allowed to over-
rule acts of Parliament in areas involving EEC law.57 Super-national
agreements, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, are
applied by the European Court of Justice, the judicial arm of the Euro-
46. Id. For example, for many years it was accepted that a prime minister could be a
member of the House of Lords. Today, however, one must renounce peerage before forming a
government. Id at 178.
47. Id at 177.
48. Id at 178.
49. Id
50. HAiLSHAM, supra note 1, at 132.
51. See PuNNETr, supra note 2, at 178; see also HAiLSHAM, supra note 1, at 133-40.
52. See WADE, supra note 7, at 8 (arguing that Parliament is not concerned with equality
of representation and that a constitutional court equivalent to the U.S. Supreme Court would
provide a fairer forum for citizens).
53. PuNNETr, supra note 2, at 179.
54. See Cornford, supra note 2, at 558.
55. Id Rather than challenge the power of ministers directly, the courts have occasion-
ally ruled that ministers have incorrectly interpreted their responsibilities. Curtis, supra note
8, at 66.
56. This surrender of sovereignty is both to British courts and to the European Court of
Justice. Curtis, supra note 8, at 64.
57. HAILSHAM, supra note 1, at 139.
1993]
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pean Community. 8
It is possible that the Treaty of Rome is, or soon will be, a stronger
guarantor of individual rights than the British Constitution. Since Euro-
pean law and precedent is still very limited, some Britons believe a writ-
ten constitution is needed to codify individual rights and freedoms and to
limit reliance on informal understandings and pan-European law.59 Giv-
ing British courts greater ability to rule on the constitutionality of stat-
utes, particularly as to individual rights, might help reduce the high
number of complaints against the British government before the Euro-
pean Court of Justice.6'
B. The British Definition of Representation
Although many ideas for constitutional reform exist, this Note will
concentrate on reform proposals affecting the electoral system, particu-
larly the narrow field of political representation. Each social system
forms its own views of what constitutes, and who determines, fair repre-
sentation. In the United States, the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of
representation.61 Although judges in the UK have recently become more
assertive, they still do not have the power to define representation based
on their interpretation of the unwritten constitution."2
Representation in the UK remains dependent upon political reali-
ties. One such example is the British government's efforts to keep Scot-
land and Wales in the UK by giving these regions extra representation, a
practice known as the "Celtic Preference. ' 63 This is accomplished by
allotting Scotland and Wales more than the share of MPs to which they
are entitled based on population." Since each MP is elected from a geo-
graphical constituency, voters in the Celtic regions are divided into more
58. Id. at 137. Hailsham argues that "[E]uropean judges at Brussels are already seised
[sic] of cases involving the government of the United Kingdom, and I simply do not believe
that English ... judges are constitutionally incompetent to deal with the same questions as
European judges." Id. at 173.
59. Cornford, supra note 2, at 558-59. This proposal would codify the human rights of
Britons, much as the Convention on Human Rights does for residents of the EEC. See Alan
Boyle, Comment, Electoral Fairness and the Liberal Party, PUBLIC LAW 168 (Summer 1981).
60. The number of complaints against the British government is the highest in the Com-
munity. Cornford, supra note 2, at 558-59.
61. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Court held that Tennessee's legislative
apportionment system violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.
WADE, supra note 7, at 7.
62. Curtis, supra note 8, at 66.
63. H. F. Rawlings, The Redistribution of Parliamentary Seats, PUBLIC LAW 324, 326
(Fall 1987). The "Celtic Preference" is evidence that Parliament is nDt concerned with equal-
ity of representation. WADE, supra note 7, at 8.
64. Rawlings, supra note 63, at 326.
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constituencies than if strict equal representation were enforced.6" A vote
cast in sparsely populated Scotland is worth more than in England,
where eighty percent of the British population lives."
To better understand why so many voters tolerate unequal represen-
tation, it is necessary to explore the theories of representation in Great
Britain dating back to the Middle Ages. These theories still influence
debate over representation.6" One theory, often called the "Tory The-
ory," holds that MPs represent a community which is an organic unit.
To successfully represent this community, constant communication be-
tween the MP and the constituents, as well as frequent elections, is re-
quired.68 From this theory evolved an attachment to geographical
constituencies. Many commentators fear that PR, with its national lists
of candidates or multi-member constituencies, will replace geographical
affiliation and responsibility.6 9
A second theory, the "Whig Theory,"70 concentrates on virtual rep-
resentation. Between elections the MP is free to vote on each issue as he
or she sees fit, rather than as the voters prefer. This is more of a pater-
nalistic approach and less an example of direct democracy. Since the MP
is responsible for protecting the interests of the entire constituency, there
is thought to be little need for frequent elections or increased franchise.7 '
This theory of virtual representation is blamed for the unequal represen-
tation of the current system.72
The final theory, the "Radical Theory," concentrates not on inter-
ests or communities, but on representing the individual.73 It is from this
theory that PR derives in its attempt to ensure individual representation
at the cost of lessened geographical representation.74 Great Britain's cur-
rent electoral system does, in some ways, draw from all three theories:
Tory theory views on geographical representation, "Whig Theory" de-
65. Id.
66. Cornford, supra note 2, at 559.
67. See RAWLINGS, supra note 23, at 11.
68. Id. at 8-9.
69. Id. at 6.
70. As the "Tory" theory bears the popular name of the Conservative Party, so the
"Whig" theory is named after the "Whig," or Liberal Party, which developed in the early
nineteenth century in opposition to the establishment. It remained one of the two main parties
until eclipsed by the Labor Party in the early twentieth century. PUNNETr, supra note 2, at
74-75.
71. RAWLINGS, supra note 23, at 7.
72. WADE, supra note 7, at 8.
73. This theory also involves the extension of suffrage to better represent the individual.
RAWLINGS, supra note 23, at 9.
74. 1,. at 7-8.
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mands for longer parliaments, and "Radical Theory" calls for universal
suffrage.75
The electoral system in the United Kingdom is presently geographi-
cally oriented, with single members responsible for each constituency. 76
Technically, each MP is accountable to all of the electorate, even non-
voters or those voting for other candidates. There are, however, limits to
this accountability.77 For a long time, Great Britain has been politically
divided, with Labor strongest in the north of England, Scotland, and
Wales, and the Conservatives strongest in the south and east of Eng-
land.7' Because of this polarization, the supporter of the weaker party in
any given part of the country might have no ideologically compatible
voice in Parliament.79 In a "safe" constituency,80 where one party has
such strength that its candidate is virtually assured election, there is little
need for an MP to address the needs of those supporting other
candidates."1
C. Mechanisms for Change in the Electoral Process
The unwritten British Constitution has no formal amendment pro-
cess, and a simple majority vote of Parliament suffices for any constitu-
tional modification.82 Certain procedures have been developed to limit
partisan control over electoral changes and constitutional evolution.83
Two such procedures are the Speaker's Conference to amend the Consti-
tution and the Boundary Commission to redraw parliamentary constitu-
ency boundaries.8 4 To specifically amend the Constitution, a Speaker's
Conference can be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Commons85
75. Id. at 11.
76. PUNNETI', supra note 2, at 43.
77. See REEVE & WARE, supra note 23, at 79-82.
78. RICHARD HOLME & HILARY MUGGRIDGE, THE CASE FOR THE SINGLE TRANSFERA-
BLE VOTE: GIVING ELECTING POWER TO EVERY VOTER (FAIR VOTES GUIDE) 13 (1984)
[hereinafter FAIR VOTES GUIDE].
79. The nearest MP from the same party may be several hundred miles away and has little
incentive to consider the problems of someone voting in a different constituency. Id. Because
the national government is so powerful and local government so weak, the lack of a nearby
spokesperson of the same party is very important. PUNNETT, supra note 2, at 179 (discussing
the unitary structure of government).
80. See infra note 127.
81. See REEVE & WARE, supra note 23, at 79.
82. PUNNETT, supra note 2, at 178.
83. See WADE, supra note 7, at 2-3.
84. PUNNET-, supra note 2, at 43-45 (boundary commissions), 42-43, 65 (Speaker's
Conferences).
85. WADE, supra note 7, at 2. The Speaker must, by convention, drop any party affiliation
once elected by the House and is considered impartial. PUNNETT, supra note 2, at 254-55.
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from the ranks of the major parties. 86 The Conference, although avail-
able for any major constitutional change, has thus far only been used to
address electoral issues.87 The Boundary Commission is concerned with
improving equality of representation to reflect population changes.88
Electoral reform of the magnitude of PR would likely involve both the
conference and the commission mechanisms.8 9
1. The Speaker's Conference
To form a Speaker's Conference, the Speaker of the House of Com-
mons appoints an ad hoe committee based on party nominations.' The
committee is composed of thirty members who attempt to avoid partisan-
ship in their discussions of electoral reform. 91 The conference, lacking
legislative powers, can only make recommendations as to possible electo-
ral changes, and its discussions are not made public.92 The value of the
conference mechanism is its ability to give all sides a voice in the debate.
Since the governing party proposes almost all legislation and has the
votes to push practically any constitutional change through Parliament,
all electoral changes have a strong political dimension.' 3 The Speaker's
Conference, by striving for nonpartisanship, adds an element of legiti-
macy to these constitutional changes. The disadvantages of the Confer-
ence are that it serves at the whim of the Prime Minister and lacks the
power to enforce its recommendations.' 4
The authority to call a Speaker's Conference and to set its parame-
ters rests with the Prime Minister. 95 Generally, prime ministers seek
86. WADE, supra note 7, at 2.
87. BRAZIER, supra note 16, at 19.
88. STANLEY DE SMITH & RODNEY BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 242-43 (6th ed. 1989).
89. See Jeff Rooker, Free Speech 2: Noughts and Crosses in the Polling Booth; Our Sstem
Creates Effective Dictatorship, INDEPENDENT, Oct. 6, 1990, at 12 (details Labor MP need for
Speakers Conference to ensure all sides have voice in new system). See also ELECTORAL RE-
FORM: FIRST REPORT OF THE JOINT LIBERAL/SDP ALLIANCE COMMISSION ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL REFORM 16 (1982) (detailing how Liberal Democrats propose boundary review to
create larger multi-member constituencies for the STV system they prefer) [hereinafter JOINT
LIBERAL/SDP ALLIANCE COMMISSION].
90. BRAZIER, supra note 16, at 19.
91. WADE, supra note 7, at 3.
92. Id.
93. PurNNETr, supra note 2, at 187-88.
94. WADE, supra note 7, at 3.
95. Id. Speaker's Conferences have been called five times, although none occurred during
the administrations of Margaret Thatcher or John Major. BRAZIER, supra note 16, at 19.
Sometimes the parameters are not even debated in Parliament, leaving the conference at the
mercy of the government. WADE, supra note 7, at 3.
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conference advice on the more technical points of the election law rather
than on more abstract principles. 96 This is not to say that major electoral
reforms have not occurred after speaker's conferences. Women's suffrage
resulted from a 1918 conference. 97 Often, however, the government of
the day made major constitutional changes without a conference, or even
in direct contradiction to conference recommendations.98 On a volatile
issue like PR to which both major parties remain opposed, 99 however, no
Speaker's Conference will be called."°°
2. Boundary Commissions
Four permanent boundary commissions, one each for England,
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, are charged with the task of al-
tering boundaries to reflect population changes. 10 1 In reality, perfect
proportionality under the current system is not possible, in part due to
discrepancies caused by the Celtic Preference. 10 2 Although boundary
commissions have recommended changes to end the preference, political
reality continues to prevent it. 10 3 The boundary commissions must make
recommendations to the Home Secretary' °4 every ten to fifteen years.
The final decision, as always, rests with Parliament, where politics play a
key role.105 Naturally, each party tries to prevent changes detrimental to
96. BRAZIER, supra note 16, at 19.
97. WADE, supra note 7, at 3.
98. For thirty years until 1948, professors and graduates of certain universities, including
Oxford and Cambridge, were able to vote for separate representatives as well as their geo-
graphical MPs. These extra representatives were elected under a PR system. Peter Kellner,
Citizens or Subjects?, INDEPENDENT, July 4, 1991, at 25 (editorial), See also ANSON, supra
note 32, at 122 (listing qualifications). Although the Speaker's Conference recommended re-
taining these seats, the government terminated them. WADE, supra note 7, at 3. See also
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, supra note 20, at 207 (the first Speaker's Conference in
1916-17 recommended PR, but it was dropped from the reform bill).
99. But see Angela Lambert, Free Speech, INDEPENDENT, Oct 6, 1990, at 12 (Labor's
opposition to PR may change as Chairman of Labor Campaign for Electoral Reform calls for
Speaker's Conference for nonpartisan PR discussion).
100. WADE, supra note 7, at 3.
101. PHILLIPS, supra note 13, at 191. The Speaker of the House of Commons serves as
chairperson of each Commission. The Commissions create population ratios and then attempt
to create equality by shifting boundaries. PUNNETr, supra note 2, at 43-44.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66. In 1983, a constituency in Glasgow had
19,000 voters, while one in Buckingham had 110,000. PUNNETT, supra note 2, at 44.
103. Rawlings, supra note 63, at 326.
104. The Home Secretary is responsible for considering the Boundary Commission recom-
mendations and for preparing the legislation to implement any changes approved. Id
105. DE SMITH & BRAZIER, supra note 88, at 242. Only in the area of electoral fraud and
malpractice do the courts have jurisdiction rather than Parliament. PUNNETT, supra note 2, at
43-44.
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its interests.10 6
The role of the British courts in "redistricting" is very limited.1 7 In
1983, Labor Party leaders sued in the Court of Appeals in an attempt to
block implementation of Boundary Commission proposals."0 ' The court
held that it lacked jurisdiction over whether the Commission recommen-
dations were fair and limited its examination to whether the Commission
exceeded its mandate."l°
If proportional representation were to be adopted in the UK, bound-
ary review would be necessary to create new multi-member constituen-
cies.110 In fact, because multi-member constituencies are fewer in
number and thus have fewer borders, boundary review under PR may
actually be simpler.1 " Creating multi-member constituencies might,
however, run afoul of the current tradition requiring respect for county
and borough borders. This tradition is a vestige of the Tory Theory of
the community as an organic unit. 2 To make this disruption as palat-
able as possible, the Liberal Party has offered to delay boundary changes
until after the first election under PR.113 The Liberals have also sug-
gested that multi-member constituencies may reduce the need for bound-
ary changes after the initial redistribution, since the number of MPs for
that multi-member constituency could be increased or reduced rather
than altering each constituency's geographic size.
11 4
II. THE CURRENT ELECTORAL SYSTEM
A. Parliament as an Electoral College
Because the government of the day is chosen from the majority
party in Parliament, the House of Commons has been called the "electo-
ral college for the prime minister."11 5 In many ways the system resem-
106. See PUNNETT, supra note 2, at 43-44. Current shifts away from urban areas mean
Labor is likely to lose in the next boundary review which began in 1992. Nicholas Timmins,
Boundary Changes Will Hurt Labor, INDEPENDENT, Aug. 5, 1991, at 6.
107. PHILLIPS, supra note 13, at 192.
108. Id at 193.
109. The court ruled that the Commission had not exceeded its mandate. Regina v.
Boundary Comm'n ex reL England, ex parte Foot, 1983 Q.B. 600, 615-16, 634 (Eng. C.A.).
110. See PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, supra note 20, at 211.
111. See ELECTORAL REFORM SOCIETY OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND: THE CASE
FOR THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE 9 (1982) [hereinafter ELECTORAL REFORM SOCIETY].
112. Rawlings, supra note 63, at 327. For more on the "Tory" theory, see supra text ac-
companying notes 68-69.
113. JOINT LIBERAL/SDP ALLIANCE COMMISSION, supra note 89, at 16 (though one won-
ders if this accommodation is to insure increased Liberal influence over the boundary review).
114. ELECTORAL REFORM SOCIETY, supra note 111, at 9.
115. Lawrence D. Longley, The Politics of Electoral Reform in Great Britain and the
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bles the presidential electoral college in the United States which
translates state popular votes into winner-take-all electoral votes."
i 6
Under both systems, the winner generally receives a bonus in electoral
votes or parliamentary seats. Many incorrectly believe, however, that
the "first past the post" system discriminates against all third parties.
117
It is true that there is a bias against third parties which have considerable
voter appeal nationwide,118 such as the Liberal Democrats in the UK, or
Ross Perot who captured nineteen percent of the presidential vote in
1992 but won no electoral votes in the United States. Both the American
and the British systems, however, favor small third parties that are re-
gionally concentrated. In the UK in 1974, for example, regional parties
such as the Scottish Nationals won 2.9% of the vote and 1.7% of the
seats, while the Liberals with 18.3% of the vote won only 2% of the
seats.1 19 Despite this regional favoritism, both the American and British
systems are based on a binary principle whereby only two parties can
effectively compete nationally for power120
B. How the Two Party System Dilutes Voter Influence
Under the binary system, the British electorate has several clear ex-
pectations: choice between two parties; locally based representation; a
strong government with an adequate majority to pass legislation; and a
clearly defined opposition. 121 A strong third party under the current sys-
tem is nearly impossible. Instead, a new party would have to replace one
of the two dominant parties, as the Labor Party replaced the Liberal
Party in the 1920s.
1 22
Local constituency work is very important to most MPs since the
parliamentary system allows individual MPs little influence over legisla-
tion. Representing and solving specific constituency problems have been
United States, 41 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 527, 527 (1988) (attributing remark to advisor of
the Prime Minister). The Prime Minister, as head of government, is chosen from the party
with the most, and usually a majority, of seats in the House of Commons. PUNNETT, supra
note 2, at 185.
116. Longley, supra note 115, at 527.
117. Id. at 528.
118. PUNNETr, supra note 2, at 67-68. For U.S. presidential results, see Howard Fineman,
The Torch Passes, NEWSWEEK, Nov./Dec., 1992 (Special Issue), at 4.
119. Longley, supra note 115, at 528-29. Meanwhile, in the U.S. in 1948, Strom Thur-
mond, running for President under the Dixiecrat Party, won 2.4% of the popular vote, but
concentration of his support in the South won him 39 electoral votes. Id.
120. Holme, supra note 31, at 132.
121. Id. at 131.
122. Id. The Liberal Party had for much of the nineteenth century been the predominant
party of the Left. Id.
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called an MP's last claim to individual identity. 2 3 Without the local
links, an MP can easily be absorbed into the regimented parliamentary
voting patterns set by the national party machine.' 24 Many members,
especially opposition MPs who are denied any real say in government,
need to respond to local concerns to gain recognition and future sup-
port.125 In reality, however, the party system is extremely important at
the local level, as well as at the national level. It is the local party that
chooses the candidate for Parliament.12 Since the majority of parlia-
mentary seats are "safe seats,"' 127 it is the party selectors who in most
cases decide who becomes an MP. 28
Voter influence on MPs is diluted in other ways as well. In races
with three or four candidates, it is likely that the winner will receive less
than fifty percent of the vote; in fact, a substantial number of MPs are
not elected by a majority of their constituents.129 It is hard to reconcile
the theory of local affiliation with the reality that many MPs are chosen
by a select party group and elected by a minority of the electorate.'1 °
The Tory Theory of community affiliation must compete with the cur-
rent system favoring the Whig Theory of virtual representation.
13
C. Britain as a Divided Nation
1. The Class Division
Some critics argue that the current electoral system aggravates and
prolongs class division in the UK, leading to an overly adversarial sys-
tem. 132 This system allegedly aggravates class relations and adversely
affects industrial relations, thereby impeding economic development.
33
It appears that class division partially causes, and partially results from,
the polarization of the two major parties into the working class North/
123. Id at 133.
124. _d See also PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, supra note 20, at 220.
125. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, supra note 20, at 220.
126. PUNNETT, supra note 2, at 47-53.
127. A "safe seat" is one in which the candidate of a particular party is virtually guaran-
teed election. Holme, supra note 31, at 133. Seats that could be won by either party, called
marginal constituencies, were cut in half between 1955 and 1983, from 166 to only 80. This is
an example of the continued polarization of the UK. Curtice & Steed, supra note 19, at 214.
128. Holme, supra note 31, at 133.
129. Plant, supra note 27, at 551.
130. FAIR VOTES GUIDE, supra note 78, at 15-29.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 67-75.
132. Holme, supra note 31, at 133. See also Ulster Contains a Warning and a Solution for
allBritain, GUARDIAN, July 27, 1992, at 13 (discussing the concern that the British system has
increased division and tension in Northern Ireland).
133. Holme, supra note 31, at 133.
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inner-city Labor areas and the more affluent South/suburban-rural Con-
servative areas.134 The dividing line between the two parties lies in 100
to 200 hotly contested constituencies.' 35
The Labor Party traditionally derives its strength, as its name sug-
gests, from the working class. 136 This group is generally strongest in the
industrial heartland of northern and central England, as well as in less
developed areas like Scotland, Wales, and the poorer inner-city. 137 It is
weaker in southern England. 138 During the last session of Parliament,
Labor had no MPs from any rural English constituency.
139
The ruling Conservative Party is strongest in the more affluent
South and in the suburbs, particularly around London. 140 It also does
well in the agricultural areas of England.' The general stereotype is
that while the Labor Party is concerned with urban and working class
issues, the Conservatives tend to concentrate on matters affecting busi-
ness, land owners, and the upper class. Recently, however, this stereo-
type has proved less accurate than in the past since there is now a
sizeable Conservative working class vote.' 42
Both social and environmental factors help determine constituency
voting patterns.143 The effect of these factors on voting patterns can be
seen in studies indicating how voters react to the surrounding electorate.
Salaried voters" in working class neighborhoods tend to vote Labor de-
spite their higher incomes. Working class people living in salaried areas,
meanwhile, are more likely to vote Conservative. 145 In general, the
swing of the working class toward the Conservative Party has been
stronger than the swing of salaried voters toward Labor. 146 Conservative
134. See ANTHONY HEATH ET AL., How BRITAIN VOTES 74 (1985).
135. JoINT LIBERAL/SDP ALLIANCE COMMISSION, supra note 89, at 3-8. These are the
"marginal" constituencies.
136. PUNNETT, supra note 2, at 75. The Labor Party was formed by an alliance between
trade unions and socialist societies in 1900. Id.
137. HEATH ET AL., supra note 134, at 74.
138. In some areas the Labor Party places third behind the Liberal Party. Id.
139. Holme, supra note 31, at 134.
140. HEATH ET AL., supra note 134, at 74.
141. Id.
142. See PUNNETF, supra note 2, at 112-16.
143. HEATH ET AL., supra note 134, at 75.
144. Salaried workers are those not on hourly wages and are generally considered more
likely to vote Conservative. Id.
145. Id. at 76-78.
146. The term "swing" is used to define the change in the fortunes of a party from one
election to the next. It is often used to compare the two major parties, When used in this
manner, the swing is measured as a percentage of the total votes cast for both major parties.
For instance, in 1992 as compared with the 1987 general election, there was an overall swing of
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dominance is due, in part, to the exodus of the middle class to the sub-
urbs.147 The increased number of private residences in the South, includ-
ing rapid suburban growth, has reduced the number of working class
communities. This expansion has coincided with a drop in the number of
low cost housing tenants in the South.148 In fact, Labor would have lost
more seats in recent elections if its support had not been so concentrated
in the North and the Celtic regions and had instead been more evenly
distributed throughout the country. 14 9
Although the two parties have difficulty winning seats in the other's
base of strength, they still win a considerable number of votes in their
areas of weakness. 150 In actual distribution of votes, Great Britain is not
as divided a nation as it appears.15 1 Nonetheless, the composition of Par-
liament does not accurately reflect the views of voters in each region.
The inequities caused by class and regional divisions can increase voter
frustration since a majority did not vote for their representative and often
voters do not have an MP of the same party for hundreds of miles.'
52
Voter frustration in the UK is evidenced by the lowest voter turn-
outs in Europe. 153 Although there are cultural differences to consider,
voter turnouts are higher in both the Republic of Ireland"M and in
Northern Ireland.15 5 Proportional representation was originally permit-
ted in Northern Ireland to give the Catholic minority a voice in the Euro-
pean Parliament,156 and today Northern Ireland remains the only area in
3% toward Labor. Of the people voting for these two parties, the move in 1992 was thus
toward Labor. Based on the estimated swing, pollsters prior to an election can estimate the
number of seats that each party will win nationally. Election Results" How Labor Lost, supra
note 15, at 62.
147. HEATH ET AL, supra note 134, at 76-79.
148. Id.a at 80.
149. Id at 75.
150. Even in the Conservative stronghold of the Southeast, in 1979 Labor polled 25%
despite winning only four seats. Conservative numbers are similar in the North. JoINT LiD-
ERAL/SDP ALLIANCE COMMISSION, supra note 89, at 5. In 1992, Labor polled over 25% in
the Outer South East, South, East Anglia, and Outer London and won over twenty seats.
Election Results How Labor Lost, supra note 15, at 62.
151. Joiner LIBERAL/SDP ALLIANCE COMMISSION, supra note 89, at 6.
152. Holme, supra note 31, at 134-35.
153. In the 1989 European Parliament elections, the average turnout ranged from Ger-
many (62.4%) to Denmark (46.2%). Great Britain's turnout was the lowest (35.9%). This
ranking excludes countries with national elections on the same day or fines for non-voters.
Lakeman, supra note 18, at 86.
154. Ireland, with national elections the same day, had a 68.3% turnout. Id.
155. Ireland has the most similar heritage to the UK. Northern Ireland now uses PR for
local and European elections. In the 1989 European elections, Northern Ireland had a 47.7%
turnout using PR to Britain's 35.9%. Id.
156. Id at 78. In fact, the British constitutional model, by stifling dialogue and promoting
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the UK permitted to use the STV (single transferable vote), a form of
PR.' 7 The higher voter turnout in Northern Ireland occurred after the
region switched from the "first past the post" system to PR. 58
2. The Divided Parties
The "first past the post" system also magnifies factional divisions
within the Labor and Conservative Parties. Since each party has a geo-
graphic area of electoral strength, the parties have little incentive to
broaden the party leadership to include citizens from other regions.' 59
The result of this insular thinking is greater influence exerted by extreme
elements within each party in forming the election manifestos.1t6 These
highly detailed election documents often do not have the support of a
large share of active party members. 161 This intra-party extremism
means that the more moderate elements of each party are often ex-
cluded.162 One commentator claims that Great Britain is in danger of
being led by a "minority within a minority."' 63
Proportional representation might moderate some of this extremism
since some PR systems, particularly STV,'6" remove some of the power
of the local party candidate selectors by putting more than one candidate
on the ballot from each party in a multi-member constituency. 6  This
gives voters who have no voice in the selection of candidates a chance to
choose between different factions of the same party.' 66 The "first past
the post" system does not allow such a choice.' 67 Candidates under the
current system may be justified in believing they owe more to party selec-
tors than to voters.'
68
The "first past the post" system may have widened the ideological
political extremism, may have contributed to Northern Ireland's volatility. Ulster Contains a
Warning and Solution for all Britain, supra note 132, at 13.
157. Since 1973, Northern Ireland has employed the STV for both local and European
elections. See THE BEST SYSTEM, supra note 30, at 21, 25. The three Northern Irish members
of the European Parliament were elected from a single three-person constituency. See PUN-
NEar, supra note 2, at 459.
158. When Britain and Northern Ireland used the same system there was no noticeable
difference in turnout. Lakeman, supra note 18, at 86.
159. See Comford, supra note 2, at 559.
160. WADE, supra note 7, at 11.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 12.
163. Id. at 11.
164. For a detailed explanation of STV, see infra text accompanying notes 292-301.
165. JOINT LIBERAL/SDP ALLIANCE COMMISSION, supra note 89, at 10.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 11.
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divisions between the parties. During the past twenty years, alternating
Conservative and Labor governments have fluctuated between nationali-
zation and privatization, resulting in a lack of continuity in government
policy.1 69 This lack of consistency undermines one of the main argu-
ments for the current electoral system: that its distortions lead to stable
government. 170 In fact, business leaders and workers who rely on indus-
trial policy are left unsure as to what future governments will do.17 ' This
polarization argument was stronger during most of the 1970s and 1980s
when the parties were ideologically far apart. 172 The Conservative Party
undertook a massive program of privatization to replace many aspects of
the socialist state that former Labor governments had attempted to cre-
ate.173 Prior to the 1992 elections, however, both parties appeared to be
moving toward the center. 74 This movement indicates that polarization
of the parties will probably play a less prominent role in the future.1
7 5
D. The Current System's Bias Against Women and Minorities
The current system forgives parties for not broadening their appeal
to attract diverse voters. It is also blamed for leaving Great Britain with
the lowest number of women and minority MPs, based on population, of
any parliament in the EEC.'76 Under PR, it is likely that women and
minority candidates would stand a better chance of election. PR encour-
ages candidates who appeal to a wider audience since there are few con-
stituencies that are "safe" victories for one party. 7 7 In the last
Parliament, only four Black or Asian MPs served.' 78 Black Labor Party
organizations currently advocate PR as a way to elect more minority
MIPs.
17 9
169. FAIR VoTEs GUIDE, supra note 78, at 4. See also Oliver, supra note 12, at 112.
170. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, supra note 20, at 219.
171. WADE, supra note 7, at 11.
172. HAILSHAM, supra note 1, at 21.
173. PuNNmT, supra note 2, at 8.
174. Peter Jenkins, Why Ashdown Can Only Hope, INDEPENDENT, May 7, 1991, at 19
(editorial) (detailing how Liberal Democrats are in danger of losing the center ground to the
two main parties). The Labor Party, for example, has reversed its stance calling for unilateral
British nuclear disarmament. Business International Country Monitor-United Kingdom, supra
note 19.
175. See Plant, supra note 27, at 556.
176. See FAIR VOTES GUIDE, supra note 78, at 22 (chart showing that in 1983, women
made up 3.5% of MPs, as opposed to 9.8% in Germany and 23.4% in Denmark).
177. Iqbal Wahhab, Labor Black Sections Likely to Support PR, INDEPENDFN'T, Mar. 22,
1991, at 4 (Home News).
178. Id.
179. The black organizations claim that Britain's black population entities them to nearly
thirty seats in Parliament. Id
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E. A Uniform Voting System for European Elections
The Treaty of Rome requires adoption of a uniform system for elec-
tion of members to the European Parliament (MEPs)."'8 As a result of
British intransigence, this has not occurred during the three European
elections to date."' Although the goal of the European Parliament is
broad-based representation, the British system ensures almost exclusive
representation to the two main parties.18 2 Since the UK is the only coun-
try in the EEC using the "first past the post" system, PR is certain to
prevail once uniformity is established.18 3 Recognizing the inevitability of
PR in European elections, the House of Lords recently considered adopt-
ing PR for EEC elections. The bill, however, languished and died in the
House of Commons.
18 4
Because of British delays, the three previous elections to the Euro-
pean Parliament were all held under the various national electoral sys-
tems.18 5 In the UK, this resulted in the usual skewed results favoring the
Labor and Conservative Parties.1 6 In 1984, for example, the Liberal/
SDP Alliance gained one-fifth of the votes but won no seats.' 7 In 1981,
the Liberal Party challenged the UK EEC electoral system before the
European Commission of Human Rights, charging that the current sys-
tem resulted in unjustifiable discrimination. 88 The Commission found
that equality of access to the electorate had not been violated, and, in a
narrow reading of the International Convention on Human Rights, it
ruled that there was no guarantee of equal voting influence.18 9 There-
fore, the current system will not be eliminated by the Commission, and
any new MEP electoral system will require consensus among EEC
members.190
The issue of uniform national elections was rekindled by the require-
ments of the Maastricht Treaty which, if adopted, requires uniformity.'91
With the EEC playing an increasingly prominent role in the legal affairs
180. See Oliver, supra note 12, at 114; see also Lakeman, supra note 18, at 77.
181. For a brief summary of the European elections, see NEILL NUGENT, TIlE GOVERN-
MENT AND POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 142-45 (2d e. 1991).
182. Lakeman, supra note 18, at 78.
183. Oliver, supra note 12, at 114.
184. See Letter from Robin Squire (Conservative MP), INDEPENDENT, July 6, 1990, at 18
(editorial).
185. PUNNETT, supra note 2, at 459.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 459-60.
188. Boyle, supra note 59, at 168.
189. Liberal Party v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 106 (1982).
190. Boyle, supra note 59, at 168.
191. MAASTRICHT TREATY art. 138(3). Under the Treaty, the EEC, the European Coal
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of member states, the Liberal Democrats have once again filed suit, this
time with the European Court of Justice. 92
The peculiarities of the "first past the post" system, in which a small
swing in party preference can significantly alter the size of each party's
delegation, may affect the composition of the European Parliament.
1 93
As in British national elections, the makeup of the British delegation to
Europe depends on a few "marginal" seats (20-25 in European elections).
In European elections, constituencies are larger than national constituen-
cies, leaving fewer seats "safe." 194 As a result, the composition of the
British delegation of MEPs can change drastically with each election. In
1984, the European Democratic Group (EDG), 19 5 of which the British
Conservative Party was the largest, gained fifty seats on six million votes,
while a more liberal group won thirty-two seats on ten million votes.
196
In 1989, the pattern reversed and the Labor Party won forty-five MEP
seats from Britain. 197 Presently the Socialist Group is the largest group
(with Britain's Labor Party the biggest contributor of seats), and the
EDG has dropped to thirty-four seats.198
Many members of Great Britain's major parties recognize that a PR
system for European elections is inevitable.199 These same government
ministers argue that a PR system for European elections does not set a
precedent for change at home since, unlike national elections, European
elections do not involve the formation of a government2co Instead, the
European Parliament is generally a consultative body that represents the
views of the electorate. In this regard, PR serves democracy well by al-
lowing a broad range of public opinion.20 1
The next European election is scheduled for 1994. The urgency in
and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community will merge to form the
European Union. Id, arts. A, C.
192. British Liberals To Sue European Parliament on Electoral Reform, REUTER LiBR.
REP., Feb. 10, 1992. The case went before the court in January of 1993, amilable in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Wires File. Patrick Wintour, Lib-Dms To Sue EC Parliament, GUARDIAN,
Jan. 14, 1993, at 6.
193. FRANcIs JACOBS & RICHARD CORBETT, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 16-17 (1990).
194. Id.
195. A "Group" in the European Parliament is the main device by which political activity
is channelled. A minimum of twelve MEPs are required. Generally, Groups form along ideo-
logical lines. NUGENT, supra note 181, at 146-47.
196. Id
197. Lakeman, supra note 18, at 85.
198. NUGENT, supra note 181, at 147-48.
199. Rights and Wrongs, DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 8, 1991, at 16.
200. Id.
201. Plant, supra note 27, at 555. See also ELECTORAL REFORM SOCIETY, supra note 111,
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deciding how to run European elections recently increased when EEC
leaders agreed to increase the representation of the larger countries, in-
cluding the UK.2"2 A recommended method to allocate these extra seats
is to adopt a partial list system and use these seats to "top up" each
party's share of the geographic constituencies.0 3 It appears, however,
that the British government will redraw European election boundaries to
avoid using PR in the 1994 European election.204 Therefore, despite the
Treaty of Rome and the Maastricht Treaty, Britain will once again use
the "first past the post" system.
I. ATTEMPTED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE
PRESENT SYSTEM
A. Strong and Stable Government
Although no party has won more than fifty percent of the popular
vote since World War II, distortions caused by the "first past the post"
system have generally left the governing parties with strong parliamen-
tary majorities.205 Critics of change point out that the British electorate
is choosing a government.20 6 They claim the voters must decide who will
form a government, not the politicians themselves who, if left unable to
govern by a hung parliament, 207 build coalitions through deal-making. 20 8
Much of the dislike of coalition building springs from the major parties'
fear that PR would give third parties the balance of power.20 9 The Lib-
202. At the Edinburgh summit held in December of 1992, it was agreed that Great Britain
will receive six additional seats in the 1994 election. The British government must rapidly
decide whether a boundary review is necessary to apportion these new seats. PR Possible in
British Euro Poll, GUARDIAN, Dec. 16, 1992, at 4.
203. Id.
204. See Same Election System for Britain, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1992, at 4 (quoting Prime
Minister as saying he would not imitate other European Community countries that use PR).
205. The Conservative Party won 42.2% of the national vote and received 57.5% of the
seats in the House of Commons during the national elections in 1987. Longley, supra note
115, at 527. In 1992, the Conservative Party won 42.8% of the vote and 51.6% of the seats.
Election Results; How Labor Lost, supra note 15, at 62. The electoral distortion caused by the
"first past the post" system was thus less pronounced in 1992. It may not be so in 1997.
206. Rights and Wrongs, supra note 199, at 16.
207. In a hung parliament, no party wins a majority of the seats in Parliament, which thus
lacks the voting majority needed to pass legislation. See Peter Kellner, Don't Call Us Paddy,
We'll Call You, INDEPENDENT, May 10, 1991, at 23 (editorial) (account of likely scenarios had
the current system caused a hung parliament in 1992). See also PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTA-
TION, supra note 20, at 221 (the Prime Minister declared his oppcsition to deals made in
"smoke-filled [back] rooms").
208. When no party has a clear majority, deals must be struck with other parties to secure
a working majority. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, supra note 20, at 221.
209. See, eg., id. (arguing that the present system gives strong government with clear man-
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eral Democratic Party believes that an election leading to a hung parlia-
ment offers it the chance to form a coalition with one of the major
parties.210 Under the current system, coalition government is unusual,
but not unknown, as illustrated by the Labor-Liberal union during the
1974-1979 Parliament.2" As the price for its support in a future coali-
tion, the Liberals are expected to demand some meaningful move toward
PR.21 2 The Liberals could be denied this coalition opportunity, however,
because the balance of power in a future parliament may not actually rest
with the third largest party, but with one of the much smaller Unionist
parties holding fewer seats.213 The Unionists are Protestants in Northern
Ireland who generally support the Conservative agenda but who have
extremist views in certain policy areas, such as the status of Northern
Ireland.2" 4 This scenario could be plausible if the Conservative Party
was the largest party but was slightly short of a majority.215 Thus, de-
spite arguments that PR gives excessive power to smaller parties, the bal-
ance of power under the UK's current system potentially rests with even
smaller and perhaps more extreme parties.21 6
The stability of the current system argument is based on the ability
of the governing party to pass its electoral manifesto and exercise its
"mandate" for change.217 This argument ignores the fact that this "man-
date" is not from a majority of the electorate and that a government's
dates). During the 1992 campaign, the ruling Conservative Party used PR to its advantage by
stressing the refusal of the Labor Party leadership to express its views on PR. PR Realities-
Proportional Representation, GUARDIAN, June 11, 1992, at 21. Meanwhile, Liberal Demo-
cratic leaders were criticized for stressing the possibility of a hung parliament, which fright-
ened voters. Lib./Dem. Election Inquest Blames Kinnock PR Flirt,' GUARDIAN, July 18,
1992.
210. See, eg., Smith, supra note 42, at 4. Prior to the 1992 election, it was calculated that
the Conservatives needed to retain a 4.2% lead over Labor or Labor needed to gain a 6.4%
lead over the Conservatives to avoid a hung parliament. The difference between these two
figures is caused by electoral bias, and figures may vary by election. Curtice & Steed, supra
note 19, at 215. In the 1992 election, the Conservatives maintained a comfortable 7.5% lead
over Labor, thus avoiding a hung parliament. The PoliticalScene, 1992 Bus. INT'L CouNTRY
REP., Aug. 10, 1992.
211. PuNNETr, supra note 2, at 193-95.
212. Liberal Delusions, THE TIMES (London), May 6, 1991 (Features).
213. Id
214. The Unionist parties are united in their desire to keep Northern Ireland in the UK
and avoid merger with the Catholic majority in the Republic of Ireland. See PUNNETr, supra
note 2, at 17. See also The Political Scene, supra note 210.
215. See Curtice & Steed, supra note 19, at 221.
216. Id
217. See PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, supra note 20, at 219 (discussing the impor-
tance of a clear mandate that would be diminished by the power wielded by third parties under
PR). But see WILLAMS & McLEAN, supra note 14, at 5 (no stability in system where re-
sources are wasted reversing predecessors' policies).
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work can be undone by future governments claiming a radically different
"mandate., 218
B. Party's Desire to Govern on Its Own
Because each party has a vested interest in the status quo, the major
constitutional changes necessary for electoral reform are unlikely with-
out a crisis such as a hung parliament. 219 The Labor Party is considered
the most likely to back PR, particularly if the Party can tap into the
sixty-three percent of the electorate that polls indicate favor electoral re-
form.22° There is an obvious tactical reason why each party wants its
opportunity to govern alone: a coalition government would dilute the
current party polarization and retard the ambitions of the more radical
elements of the parties.221 For instance, in the 1970s the Labor Party
General Secretary urged supporters to oppose PR because it would make
a "democratic socialist Britain" impossible.222 The flaw with this argu-
ment, of course, is that under PR such a socialist policy would fail, not
through some fault of the electoral system, but precisely because a major-
ity of the electorate opposed it.
223
The Conservative Party, in power since 1979, perceives little need
for major constitutional and electoral reform.224 Con.ervatives are quick
to point to PR countries with weak coalitions, such as Italy and Israel, as
examples to be avoided.225 PR advocates counter that other countries
218. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, supra note 20, at 219.
219. Vernon Bogdanor, Electoral Reform and British Politics, 6 ELECTORAL STUDIES 115,
118-19 (1987).
220. Patrick Dunleavy & Stuart Weir, Ignore the People at Your Peril, INDEPENDENT,
Apr. 25, 1991, at 27 (editorial). By election time, however, this figure had dropped to 57%,
perhaps due to Conservative exploitation of the Labor Party's wavering stance on PR. PR
Realities-Proportional Representation, supra note 209, at 21.
221. WADE, supra note 7, at 12.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 11-12.
224. See, eg., PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, supra note 20, at 221-22. The Party
maintains this position despite polls, such as one in 1991, that concluded that 63% of voters
believe the system needs "quite a lot, or a great deal of improvement," 45% are content with
coalition government, and 63% want either a Bill of Rights or PR. Dunleavy & Weir, supra
note 220, at 27. For a discussion of the views of the Left, see Bogdanor, supra note 219, at 118-
19 (discussing traditional Left arguments for PR).
225. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, supra note 20, at 221-22. Both of these countries
are considering reforming their PR systems. Hugh Carnegy, Herzog Urges Electoral Reform,
FIN. TIMES, June 24, 1992, at 4 (Israel); Ian Davidson, Common Thread of Reform, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 1992, at 34 (Italy); and 'Back PR' Call to Blair, Brown, supra note 20, at 3
(arguing that the highwater mark for PR has passed). Both Italy and Israel, however, are
extreme examples of pure PR with no restrictions on small parties. This is not the method the
UK need adopt.
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under PR, such as Germany, have very stable governments and that the
level of stability reflects cultural expectations. 26 A PR system can be
developed either to prevent one party domination, as in Italy,' 7 or to
encourage strong government, as in Germany.22 8
C. The Rise of Extremist Parties
Other commentators contend that the "first past the post" system
weeds out small and potentially dangerous extremist parties by favoring
larger parties.229 They point to the comparatively rapid growth of ra-
cism on the continent as proof of extremism under PR.3° During the
1992 campaign, one prominent Conservative politician claimed that
"proportional representation would be a pact with the devil. PR has
helped fascists to march again in Europe. )
231
The slower growth of extremist groups in Great Britain, if indeed
true, may be due more to cultural differences between Great Britain, an
island nation with a comparatively long history of democracy, and conti-
nental nations, whose unprotected land borders have historically permit-
ted waves of invasion and immigration.232  Furthermore, the
Conservatives ignore the fact that the current British system still allows
for a geographically concentrated extremist group to reach Parlia-
ment.2 33 The Conservative claim is equally disingenuous because it con-
flicts with the situation in Northern Ireland, the UK's most troubled
region. In Northern Ireland, the British government permitted PR for
European elections precisely to reduce the risk of violence.231 PR further
limits small parties by employing a minimum vote threshold, such as five
226. REEVE & WARE, supra note 23, at 162-63. The German federal system, with regional
governments, provides more levels for plurality and multi-party democracy than the central-
ized British government, which by the next election, due by 1997, will have been under Con-
servative control for nearly twenty years. Keep to the Plural Path-Constitutional Reform
Needed to Maintain Permanent Plurality, GUARDIAN, May 1, 1992, at 18.
227. Italy's system was designed to prevent one party from achieving dictatorial powers in
an effort to avoid a repeat of its Fascist past. In reality, the system as designed has proved
unworkable. William D. Montalbaro, Italy's Chaotic Electoral System Confronting the Execu-
tioner, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1993, at HS.
228. REEVE & WARE, supra note 23, at 162-63.
229. See ag., On the Seamier Side, ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 1991, at 67.
230. Id
231. Vernon Bogdanor, The Public Relations of Proportional Representation, GUARDIAN,
Apr. 17, 1992, at 21.
232. On the Seamier Side, supra note 229, at 67.
233. For a discussion of small Unionist parties, see supra note 214. In addition, Northern
Ireland, which still uses the "first past the post" system for national elections, has sent several
IRA and Protestant extremists to Parliament. Bogdanor, supra note 231, at 21.
234. Bogdanor, supra note 231, at 21.
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percent, before any parliamentary seats may be won.235 The election of
proportionally more minority MPs under a PR system might also coun-
terbalance any racial extremism.
236
D. Complexities of Proportional Representation and Its Effect on
Local Representation
PR systems involve complex formulas, and immediate results are
impossible since votes are recomputed several times until a candidate
reaches the quota for election. The quota is determined by a mathemati-
cal formula based on the number of votes cast. 237 Under this system, it is
possible for a candidate leading on the first round to lose once the voters'
second choices for other candidates are distributed.238 Some critics claim
that the British electorate will be unable to understand both the complex-
ities of the system and the need for delays.239 Proponents of PR counter
that PR works in countries with traditions similar to those of the UK,
such as Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.240
The British system of representation is based on the idea of local
contact.241 Many fear that PR, with its national party candidate lists or
multi-member constituencies, will end direct contact between MPs and
clearly definable geographic constituencies.242 Yet advocates of PR, such
as the Liberal Party, do not seek an end to this link. Instead, they advo-
cate multi-member constituencies based on regions whose "natural
boundaries" are set by the historical makeup of that region, thus re-
turning to the "Tory" theory of representation.243
235. Germany uses such a 5% threshold. Oliver, supra note 12, at 114-15.
236. Bogdanor, supra note 231, at 21.
237. Oliver, supra note 12, at 120-21. The quota is the number of votes required to be
elected, and it varies based on the total number of votes in the election. Id. See infra note 299.
238. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, supra note 20, at 211. Under the STV system, for
example, each time the lowest vote getter is dropped on each round, his or her votes must be
reapportioned until one candidate reaches 50%. See WILLIAMS & MCLEAN, supra note 14, at
17-18.
239. See Plant, supra note 27, at 555 (citing a Danish government fact sheet which claimed
that only forty people in the entire country fully understood the mathematics of the electoral
system).
240. THE BEST SYSTEM, supra note 30, at 21.
241. See supra text accompanying note 68.
242. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, supra note 20, at 220.
243. In other words, definable areas, such as boroughs or cities, would not be divided
among constituencies. JOINT LIBERAL/SDP ALLIANCE COMMISSION, supra note 89, at 9. See
also RAWLINGS, supra note 23, at 11.
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IV. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SYSTEMS
There are two main varieties of proportional representation: the
List System and the preferential voting methods like the STV.2" The
systems vary based on whether fair representation of parties or of indi-
viduals is sought. The List System concentrates on proportional repre-
sentation of the parties, while the STV concentrates on representing the
general population. 245 The systems also differ in their emphasis on the
national party machine in choosing candidates.24 '
A. The List Systems
Under the List System, each party presents its candidates to the
electorate as a list.247 The party chooses the order in which to rank its
candidates, with the more important candidates generally listed higher.
Each vote for the party then goes to the highest ranking candidate still
requiring votes for election.248 The candidates appearing further down
the list will be elected only if the party does well on election day.249 This
method gives great importance to candidate ranking on the list and thus
to the national party organization that develops it.
2 °
1. The Pure List System
Under the "pure" List System, the lists are drawn up by the extra-
parliamentary party organizations. 25' Generally in countries that use the
"pure" system, such as Israel, there are no regulations on how the lists of
candidates are prepared.252 The voter cannot choose whom his or her
vote elects, since votes for a party go to the candidate highest on the list
who has not yet been elected.253 In other countries, such as Belgium and
Denmark, the voter can mark a preference for a particular candidate ap-
pearing anywhere on the list, making it possible for a candidate appear-
244. PUNNETr, supra note 2, at 69-72.
245. Plant, supra note 27, at 554. Both can be considered fair, depending on whether Par-
iament must be a microcosm of society (STV) or whether there should be competition between
the parties as agents of the electorate (List).
246. Oliver, supra note 12, at 112-13.
247. Id at 113.
248. REEVE & WARE, supra note 23, at 151-52.
249. Id.
250. In Holland, only three candidates since World War II who were placed at the bottom
part of their party's lists were elected. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, supra note 20, at
212.
251. Oliver, supra note 12, at 113.
252. Id. In Israel there is no regional affiliation, and all legislators are deemed to represent
the entire country. But see Carnegy, supra note 225, at 4.
253. Oliver, supra note 12, at 113.
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ing lower on the list to overtake higher-placed candidates.2" 4 When no
preference is indicated, the vote is distributed to the highest candidate on
the list.255 The variation used in Finland decreases party power by list-
ing the party candidates alphabetically, forcing the voter to indicate a
preference.25 6
The "pure" List System requires either very large constituencies or
none at all. This is at odds with the Tory Theory concept of geographic
representation accepted in Great Britain.257 A proliferation of small par-
ties under the "pure" system can also make governing difficult.258 An
excellent example of this proliferation is found in Israel, where small reli-
gious parties have held the balance of power in almost every government
since independence.259
2. The German "Hybrid" List System
Germany dealt with the twin problems of the "pure" List System-
no geographic representation and the proliferation oF small parties-by
modifying the system.26 Germany addressed the former problem by giv-
ing the voters two votes, one for a constituency MP elected under the
"first past the post" system, and another vote for a regional list.26t The
danger of small parties is lessened by requiring a party to win five percent
of the votes, or at least three constituencies, before the party is allocated
any regional list seats.262
One-half of the German Parliament, the Bundestag, is elected from
single-member constituencies, much as they are in the UK.26 3 The other
half comes from party lists.26" The list votes for each party are aggre-
gated nationally, and each party is allotted list seats in addition to the
constituency seats in order to increase, or "top up," that party's repre-
sentation to reflect its national share of list votes.265
254. Id.
255. Id. at 113-14.
256. Id at 113.
257. See RAWLINGS, supra note 23, at 11.
258. REEVE & WARE, supra note 23, at 72.
259. Four religious parties with eighteen out of 120 seats hold the balance of power. PRo-
PORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, supra note 20, at 220. Israel has no threshold to weed out
smaller parties. Id.
260. See Oliver, supra note 12, at 114-15.
261. Id.
262. JOINT LIBERAL/SDP ALLIANCE COMMISSION, supra note 89, at 13.
263. PUNNETr, supra note 2, at 71.
264. Id.
265. Oliver, supra note 12, at 114-15. The Free Democrat Party has not been in the oppo-
sition in Germany since 1969, yet it won its first constituency seat in twenty-nine years in the
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Critics argue that the List System "nationalizes" the selection pro-
cess and gives increased power to the national party at the expense of
local committees.266 To guard against this nationalization of the process,
German law governs party selection.267 It is unlikely, however, that a
legally imposed monitoring system would be acceptable to British polit-
ical parties. 268 Germany and the UK also differ on who handles constit-
uency problems. In a federalist country like Germany, there is a layer of
regional government (called Land) that can handle many constituency
complaints.269 With no such regional government in the UK, the geo-
graphical importance of the MP is increased.2"0 One other difference be-
tween the List and the "first past the post" systems is the absence under
the List System of by-elections27 to replace MPs who leave office. In
Germany, the party appoints the next candidate on the list as the new
MP, rather than holding a special election.272
Despite the claims that PR leads to unsteady coalitions, Germany
enjoys a remarkably stable government.273 The Free Democrats are a
moderate party that tends to remain in long-term alliances; the most re-
cent coalition switch occurred in 1982.274 Previous coalitions openly
formed so that voters knew the composition of alliances prior to the
election.275
3. Formulae for Allocating Seats
Each PR system seeks to minimize any disproportion based on the
definition of proportionality that underpins it.276 The d'Hondt method,
invented by Thomas Jefferson to apportion seats in Congress, is used in
Germany and throughout much of Europe. 2 " It awards the next seat to
the party with the highest value under the formula: votes won / (seats
1990 elections. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, supra note 20, at 213. The Free Demo-
crat's Ml's have traditionally come from the regional lists. Oliver, supra note 12, at 116.
266. Oliver, supra note 12, at 118.
267. Id
268. RAWLiNGS, supra note 23, at 232.
269. Oliver, supra note 12, at 117.
270. PUNNErT, supra note 2, at 279-83.
271. A by-election is a special election held in a constituency whose member has either died
or left office during the life of a parliament. Id at 38, 47, 53.
272. Oliver, supra note 12, at 117.
273. Id at 116.
274. Id
275. Id.
276. Michael Gallagher, Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems, 10
ELECTORAL STUDIES 33, 33 (Mar. 1991).
277. Id at 34. See also Oliver, supra note 12, at 115.
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won so far) + 1.27s As a seat is won, that party's average will drop. If
the party's average dips below the average of another party, the other
party will gain a seat.279 The d'Hondt formula concentrates on minimiz-
ing the over-representation of the most over-represented party. The
formula is severe on the smaller parties, thus making the formula popular
with larger parties.28 0
A second major formula for allocation is the Sainte-Lague form
used, with modification, in several Scandinavian countries.28 This
formula reduces the party averages quicker than does the d'Hondt
formula, making it easier for small parties to win seats. 282 In its purest
form, it is considered too favorable to small parties.28 3
4. The Blake Commission
In 1976, the Blake Commission developed a system called the Addi-
tional Member System (AMS) for the UK, which operates somewhat like
Germany's system.284 Under the AMS, three quarters of the House of
Commons would be elected under the "first past the post system," and
the remaining quarter would be allocated to the parties. 285 The country
would be divided into regions, and one quarter of the seats would be
divided among the parties to compensate for any inequalities resulting
from the "first past the post" system in each region.286
Instead of party lists, the unsuccessful constituency candidates from
each party would be listed in order based on the percentage of votes the
party received in the "first past the post" contest. Additional seats would
be won by each party's highest-placed candidates. 287 Adopting the Com-
mission's recommendations, by allocating seats by party, would have
marked the first time party affiliation was officially recognized as a quali-
fication for Parliament.288
278. Gallagher, supra note 276, at 35.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 34.
281. The Sainte-Lague formula is used in modified form in Denmark, Norway, and Swe-




284. Oliver, supra note 12, at 118.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 118-119.
287. Id. The Blake Commission also recommended the retention of local party selection of
candidates. RAWLINGS, supra note 23, at 232.
288. David Utting and Peter Wilby, Election 1992: Miffed? Just Lie Back and Dream of
Ireland, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 12, 1992, at 20.
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One problem with the AMS is that the voting percentage that a can-
didate receives would depend on the number of candidates in that partic-
ular constituency. When the number of candidates becomes a factor in
determining outcome, the election is no longer a true measure of popu-
larity.28 9 Critics also doubted that a twenty-five percent regional alloca-
tion would be enough to ensure proportionality between the parties.29°
Such criticisms prevented the Blake Commission proposals from ever be-
ing implemented.291
B. The Single Transferable Vote
One way to achieve PR without increasing the power of the political
parties is to adopt the STV system, which is concerned with the propor-
tionality of individual votes.292 Under the STV, each constituency has
multiple members, ranging from two or three for less populous areas to
five for most of the UK. Five is generally considered the optimal number
since, in constituencies with fewer MPs, large minority parties will once
again be underrepresented.293
Each party may put up as many candidates as there are seats in the
constituency, or it may choose to put up fewer candidates to avoid dilut-
ing its vote.294 The voter marks the names of the candidates in order of
preference. Allowing voter preference enables the electorate to choose
among candidates from the same party to find one ideologically similar
to the voter.2 95 Under the STV, the quota to win a seat equals: [votes
cast / # of MPs + 1] + 1.296 This is the "Droop Method" used in the
Republic of Ireland.297 The first preference of each voter is allocated to
that constituency's candidates. Any candidate meeting the quota on the
first round wins a seat, and excess votes are divided, weighted according
to the proportion of the excess votes to the total votes cast for the win-
ning candidate, among the remaining candidates based on the voters' sec-
ond choices.298 In each round the least successful candidate is
eliminated, and his or her votes are redistributed. Note that even in a
safe seat, where a candidate wins a huge majority, none of the excess
289. Oliver, supra note 12, at 119.
290. Id
291. Id
292. Plant, supra note 27, at 554.
293. Oliver, supra note 12, at 122.
294. Id at 120.
295. Id
296. REEVE & WARE, supra note 23, at 150. See also Oliver, supra note 12, at 120.
297. Oliver, supra note 12, at 120.
298. REEVE & WARE, supra note 23, at 150-51.
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votes are wasted.2 99 In Ireland, the system has led to governments with
small majorities and some coalitions. 3" The STV is also employed in
local and European elections in sectarian Northern Ireland. Proponents
of STV point to its successful use in this part of the UK and in countries
with societies similar to Great Britain as evidence that the STV is the
best system for Great Britain.301
Problems with the STV include the need for larger multi-member
constituencies. Critics argue that this will reduce an MP's sense of duty
to constituents since another MP in the same area shares responsibility
for the constituency. 30 2 This argument is not very persuasive, however,
since a secret ballot makes it impossible for an MP to know who voted
for whom. A more serious problem is that the new constituencies will
have to be much larger than current ones and will cross local government
boundaries. 3  The Liberal Democrats, long advocates of STV, claim
this problem can be avoided by tailoring the new constituencies to "natu-
ral communities." 3°  Since local government boundaries do not always
follow the boundaries of a recognizable community, some governmental
boundaries would be crossed. To the voter, however, this would seem
reasonable because the community would still appear to be intact.305
V. CONCLUSION: THE REALITY OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND THE BEST SYSTEM
The electoral system of a democracy reflects the shared experiences
and legal traditions of that country. Generally, the electoral system de-
velops in response to perceived political threats to the stability of the
society. For this reason Italy, after World War II, developed an electoral
299. Oliver, supra note 12, at 121. For example, in a five-member STV constituency where
100,000 votes were cast, the quota under the Droop Method would be 16,667 votes to be
elected. Multiply 16,667 by the number of MPs in that constituency (five) and over 83,000 (or
83%) of the votes are effective in either the first or later voting rounds. Less than 17% of the
votes do not contribute to the victory of a candidate. Id.
300. 1d at 122.
301. Id. at 125.
302. Id.
303. PUNNETT, supra note 2, at 72. Note that the powers of these local governments in the
UK are very limited: they are merely agents of the central government and do not wield in-
dependent powers. Id. at 179.
304. JOINT LIBERAL/SDP ALLIANCE COMMISSION, supra note 89, at 16-17. For a discus-
sion of theories of representation, see supra text accompanying notes 67-75. The aim in draw-
ing boundaries would be to include all persons in an identifiable community into the same
constituency. Obviously, this requires constituencies of different sizes. If this community con-
cept created constituencies of vastly different sizes, the degree of proportionality would be
altered. Oliver, supra note 12, at 123.
305. JOINT LIBERAL/SDP ALLIANCE COMMISSION, supra note 89, at 16.
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system believed capable of preventing the reoccurrence of fascism, which
in the 1940s appeared to be the greatest threat to its fledgling democ-
racy.3"6 As a result, the Italian electoral system provides a parliamentary
voice to parties supported by even one percent of the electorate." 7
Similarly, the British electoral system, with its premium on strong
and unified government, is a product of the Norman invasion of the elev-
enth century, where centralized government was necessary to control a
conquered people.308 The problem in both Italy and the UK is that
although the threats to democracy change, the electoral systems these
dangers spawned rarely change with them. The greatest threat to de-
mocracy in the UK today is the threat of alienation between the govern-
ment and the people caused by a system that, while serving those in
Parliament, does not represent the people.
In several major western European countries, attention is turning to
constitutional reform.309 The political changes caused by the fall of
Communism1 0 and particularly by the integration of the EEC are forc-
ing European governments to adapt and experiment. 311 France is con-
sidering limiting the power of the President and strengthening its
Parliament.1 2
Germany is also considering constitutional reforms to prepare for
the European Union envisioned by the Maastricht Treaty.31 3 Italy is pre-
paring referendums to overhaul its electoral system. 31 4 These attempts at
constitutional reform inspire those Britons who urge the government to
consider necessary changes to the UK's outmoded constitution. 315
The British electoral system needs reform. Although based on
sound principles of stability, geographical representation, and individual-
ized contact between MP and constituent, the British electoral system
has in many ways betrayed those values. As Lord Hailsham noted:
[T]he system... has produced a sort of see-saw motion in policy, a
polarization rather than an evolutionary development, and, as [a] re-
sult... the electorate found themselves.., caught in the manifesto
306. Montalbaro, supra note 227, at H5.
307. Id
308. ANsoN, supra note 32, at 25-26.
309. Ian Davidson, The Weaknesses of Strengik Europe, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1992, at 30.
310. This fear of Communism had been a strong contributor to the Christian Democratic
Party's control on Italian government. Italy, People Power, ECONoMIST, Oct. 17, 1992, at 59.
311. Davidson, supra note 309, at 30.
312. Davidson, supra note 225, at 34.
313. Id
314. Montalbaro, supra note 227, at H5.
315. lId
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and mandate trap, which compels them to accept all or nothing in a
party's platform.3 16
Stability in British government is seen by the current system's sup-
porters as the ability to pass the ruling party's electoral manifesto and
exercise its own "mandate" for change.31 7 This perception of stability
ignores the fact that this "mandate" is not from a majority of the electo-
rate, and any progress made in carrying out this agenda can be undone
by a future government with a radically different "mandate."
A PR system would improve the democratic process in the UK. PR
would inhibit the internal and external polarization processes dividing
the parties. Instead, the parties would gain an incentive to broaden their
appeal, since the demise of the "first past the post" syitem would end the
bias toward the two largest parties. Furthermore, a vote for the smaller
parties would no longer be wasted. PR is inclusive rather than exclusive;
it attempts to broaden the debate which, although inconvenient for the
parties currently favored, is the essence of democracy.
Opponents of PR argue that the "high tide" of proportional repre-
sentation has passed. 3 s They point to Israel and Italy, which are both
considering limiting PR to lessen the power of smaller parties.31 9 Such
arguments are fallacious because the electoral systems cited are simply
examples of systems designed to protect against problems that no longer
exist. PR does not by definition require that all extremist parties be given
a voice. The UK can avoid this pitfall through a PR system employing
minimum popular vote thresholds. In its quest for electoral reform, the
UK is free to learn from the mistakes of others.
One form of PR, the List System, has the advantage of proportional-
ity, but at the cost of local representation. Since MPs would be elected
by list, there would be no geographic connection between MPs and a
definable constituency. Such a system would be difficult in the UK be-
cause of the important role the MP plays as intermediary between citizen
and the highly centralized national government. Even the German List
316. HAILSHAM, supra note 1, at 59. Hailsham never endorsed PR, but he did see the
unchecked power of the House of Commons through the unwritten English constitution as a
great threat to Britain. Id.
317. See PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, supra note 20, at 219 (discussing the impor-
tance of a clear mandate that would be diminished by the power wielded by third parties under
PR). But see WILLIAMS & McLEAN, supra note 14, at 5 (no stability in system where rc-
sources are wasted reversing predecessors' policies).
318. 'Back PR' Call to Blair, Brown, supra note 20, at 4.
319. Carnegy, supra note 225, at 4. See also Davidson, supra note 225, at 34 (Italy). Even
in Japan, some blame PR, as currently devised, for graft in gift-giving by candidates during
elections. Rebel Talk ECONOMIST, Jan. 30, 1993, at 32.
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System and the Blake Commission proposal do not solve the local repre-
sentation gap. Under the German system, some MPs are elected region-
ally and others are chosen from lists. Does this mean that only some
German MPs are concerned with constituency problems?320 If so, then
the job of a German list MP is substantially different than that of a Ger-
man constituency MP. Such a change in the responsibilities of a British
MP is unwise because it would decrease the local affiliation of MPs with
their constituents. In addition, the List System concentrates too much
power in the national party machinery.
321
The STV, while not perfect, is the best system to ensure propor-
tional representation in the UK. The STV system concentrates on indi-
vidual representation of the voter rather than on the party. By retaining
local selection of candidates, the STV does not make MPs more beholden
to the national party. Multi-member constituencies, which are necessary
for the STV, have previously been used in Great Britain.3" A very
strong argument in favor of the STV is its successful application in one
area of the UK and its use to form the national government in Ireland.
In neither part of Ireland has the complexity of the system or the size of
the constituencies adversely affected the STV's success.
Under the STV system, local affiliation is preserved by maintaining
constituencies, albeit larger in size than current constituencies.
Although PR lacks the single member constituencies of the "first past the
post" system, under the STV it is more likely that supporters of various
parties will gain an MP. This will reduce the polarization of the UK by
recognizing the substantial number of voters whose voices are lost under
"first past the post." By sacrificing a portion of the Tory Theory of geo-
graphical representation, the UK would move toward the universal polit-
ical involvement advocated by the Radical Theory.
The STV would also provide a more stable government than the
present electoral system, if stability is defined more broadly as continuity
between succeeding governments. By moderating the ideological ele-
ments of the party and increasing diversity, the party manifestos would
probably be more moderate as well. As a result, each change of power
would no longer require a new party to concentrate the majority of its
efforts correcting what it sees as past mistakes and would instead allow it
320. See PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, supra note 20, at 213 (note the Conservative
concern that constituency MPs would do most of the work while list MPs would only be
concerned with appeasing the national party).
321. Passage of legislation requires party unity and discipline. For a survey of the organi-
zation and importance of the parties, see PUNNETr, supra note 2, at 73-144.
322. For a discussion of university MPs, see supra note 98.
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more time to confront problems of the present. The tradeoff under the
STV system is that coalition government is far more likely. Coalitions,
however, do not necessarily lead to instability. As noted previously, Ger-
many has had coalition governments under its List System for many
years and over two decades has had only one change of power. The like-
lihood of unstable coalitions seems to depend more on the culture in
question than on the use of PR. In fact, many would argue that the UK,
because the same party has been in power since 1979, is in need of the
changes that coalitions would bring.
The main hindrance to the British adoption of the STV or any other
PR system is the refusal of the main parties to support electoral change.
This may change if Labor adopts electoral reform. Having lost four
straight elections, and progressively becoming a more moderate party,
the Labor Party is reevaluating its opposition to PR. As a party seeking
to bring democratic socialism to the UK, the Labor Party was formerly
ideologically committed to radical change and would not accept the
moderating influence of PR. Now, as the Party becomes more centrist,
the ideological argument against PR is no longer as valid. The remaining
hesitation is the product of the practical desire of any party to govern on
its own.
Although Labor leadership has yet to endorse PR, many within the
Party argue that Labor's new battle should be for constitutional and elec-
toral reform. By embracing PR, Labor would capture the constitutional
reform banner currently used successfully by the smaller Liberal Demo-
cratic Party.
The eventual adoption of a uniform voting system using PR for Eu-
ropean elections will also aid the cause of electoral reform. If the UK
can successfully use PR for European elections, it will be harder for op-
ponents like the Conservative Party to argue that PR is foreign to
Britons. Although electoral reform is most likely to occur as the result of
a crisis such as a hung parliament, the chance of a gradual evolution has
grown as the issue has gained national attention. This is important since
electoral reform is perhaps the most pressing constitutional change
needed in the UK. If the political parties in Great Britain are forced to
alter their views on PR, it may be the first step toward the greater limits
on governmental power advocated by Lord Hailsham.323 Indeed, the fi-
nal outcome could be a new constitution, "its terms... reduced to writ-
ing and defined by law." '324
323. HAILSHAM, supra note 1, at 132.
324. Id.
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